The Importance of Strategic Seaports

Well, it seems we've come to the end. What more is there to say about the relative and absolute superiority of the kriegsmarine over the adjacent branches of the wermacht in WWII, the two branches being, namely, the heer and the luftwaffe, two organizations whose contributions to the german effort pale in comparision to those made by the valiant kriegsmariners, hardy, stout, resilient men who would say nothing to a cut in their rations of grog and rum, men born from the salt of the earth, or, rather, the salt of the sea, men who are men, who were men, who will always be men, that hasn't already been said? And yet, my colleagues are still not content to bow down at my argumentative feet and shower them with praise. Perhaps I shall never convince them. Perhaps, that is the way is was always meant to be. In any case, I leave you, the loyal and faithful hypothetical reader, with this bit of advice: remember the importance of strategic seaports.

Join the Merchant Marine! It's...Aquatic!

Thus far, the kriegsmarine has been the veritable whipping boy for you jackanapes, but, Jonathan and Sam, you have both failed to take into account one major aspect of a nation's navy: the merchant marine. What does the merchant marine do? It transports stuff. To elaborate, stuff necessary to both the war effort and the well-being of a country's citizens/subjects/underlings. Now, here's just a few numbers that are sure to shock those smiles off your faces:

In the Second World War, German U-boats sank nearly 14.7 million tons of allied shipping, which amounts to 2,828 ships (around two thirds of the total allied tonnage lost). The United Kingdom alone suffered the loss of 11.7 million tons, which is 54% of the total Merchant Navy fleet at the outbreak of the Second World War. 30,000 merchant seamen were killed aboard convoy vessels during the war.

That's a lot of stuff, and people, that never got to their intended destinations. I have not been able to determine either the psychological or economic effect of this damage on the British and their allies, but I'm sure it was important enough to warrant some type of recognition from you two that the kriegsmarine wasn't just rum, the lash, etc. They did other stuff too.

Kriegsmarinely Courage

This may be a minor point, but I feel it is necessary to counter some of Sam's more felonious arguments. Sam uses the "statistics" of Iron Cross recipients to make the claim that the men of the heer had more courage and gumption than their naval equivalents. According to teh internets, "the Iron Cross was awarded for bravery in battle as well as other military contributions in a battlefield environment." Well, this is rather easy to accomplish (I assume) with the physical freedom afforded to infantry by the division of men in the heer and by the nature of a terrestial environment, but to bravely split an infinitive and go out, guns-a-blazing, in some attempt for personal glory is not only impractical in the metallic confines of a u-boat, but it would also be a danger to the other men. The operation of these submarines and battleships required a cohesive, less individual way of doing things. In order to win the battle, you had to be a cog in the machine; there was no room for heroic, one-man escapades. Notice that the only two kriegsmarine members mentioned on the above-linked wikipedia page were submarine captains. They were the only ones who could, and should, have been making significant decisions in those settings. In fact, one might say that the true courage required to be in the kriegsmarine made most ineligible for the Iron Cross, and, in fact, one just did say that.

I Could have Written about Transformers...

Though I had the most devastatingly erudite response to Mr. Sam's assertions that the rather Freudian landguns of the heer could, in his parlance, "pwn" the kriegsmarine (hint: my argument involved the u-boats becoming transformers), I have been convinced to change the very nature of my analysis. Instead of tearing at the proverbial throats of my colleagues over which branch of the wermacht would win, nay pwn, in an all-out-war between the three, I am shifting, oh shifting (ever so much!), the focus to which branch of the wermacht played a more important role in the German war effort. Such drastic decisions will require a change in my thesis, and, as of this moment, I am not up to the task, but, suffice to say, it will confirm the awesome superiority of the kriegsmarine!

Father Knows Best: A Missive on the Patriarchal Nature of Familial Relations and Societal Structures in Late 16th Century Protestant Germany

Having signed myself up to research that rather nebulous designation of human communal organization, the family, I found myself overwhelmed. Had I the temerity to venture within the dusty confines of my MEH textbook, a veritable deluge of facts would have rained down upon my person and flattened my frontal lobe. Thus, I was compelled to continue and complete my investigation on youtube. After much time spent researching (that is, watching Soulja Boy music videos with a mixture of amusement and awed horror), I came upon the introduction for a television show that occurred early in American broadcasting history, "Father Knows Best."

What has this to do with late 16th century Protestant Germany, the prospect of receiving which information you so titillatingly promised in your title, you ask of me (and in a rather stilted fashion, I might add). Well, if you hadn't realized this most obvious fact already, "Father Knows Best" was the case at that time, in that place, for those people. Though Luther believed in spiritual equality between the sexes, such was not so where politics and economics were involved. He considered women to be wanton harlots whose shortcomings could only be remedied by the "governance of a godly husband" (Coffin 488). Protestants also elevated the family, as well as the married couple to a position almost of godliness and holiness, and it was up to the father to make sure his little ones were well aware of the who-what and what-now of the finer points of religion. In short, it probably wouldn't have been that fun to be alive in late 16th century Protestant Germany.

The Sinatra Doctrine

When one hears the name Sinatra crooning past their aural lobe, a cascading stream of shimmering vocals comes to mind, or rather, for the less poetic/pretentious-minded, that dude who sang all those jazzy tunes that my grandmama still listens to. But, did you know that he was also the creator of a significant piece of Russian history? Of course you did not, for that previous statement was indubitably false.

Yet this in turn begs the question of why there is a Soviet doctrine named after lil' Frankie (as we referred to Sinatra back at school). Well, I feel I should let wikipedia explain:

"Sinatra Doctrine" was the name that the Soviet government of Mikhail Gorbachev used jokingly to describe its policy of allowing neighboring Warsaw Pact nations to determine their own internal affairs. The name alluded to the Frank Sinatra song "My Way"—the Soviet Union was allowing these nations to go their own way.

Ye gods, was this significant! The Sinatra Doctrine basically thumbed its nose (in the most Russian way possible) at the Brezhnev Doctrine and all it stood for - i.e. Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. My friends, this was the beginning of the end - no! - in fact, my friends, this was the end of the end, or maybe even the penultimate chapter of the end, for the Soviet Union. The year was 1989, Milli Vanilli was at the top of its game, Gorbachev was relatively hairless, and freedom was in the air (it smells a bit like fish and takes a while to get used to). Yes, soon after the proclamation of the Sinatra Doctrine, the majority of the Autumn Revolutions took place, and Eastern Europe never had any more problems.

Nuh-uh! The Kriegsmarine was so much cooler!

Ah, yes. Jonathan has found a glittering gem of an example, one with which he might attempt to destroy my argument in one fell swoop of his word-processing application. What is this horror I speak of - namely, the sinking of the Bismarck. Yet, what seems like a cut and dried case is nothing but a statistical discrepancy of the utmost degree. To begin, I say that the fabled British torpedo bombers that Jonathan so greatly adores simply got lucky that time. You disagree. Well, why not examine the wikipedia entry on torpedo bombers:

One crucial limitation of a torpedo bomber was that it had to fly a long, straight course at a constant ground level altitude of 30 metres (100 ft) toward the target ship before launching its torpedo. The torpedoes were very sophisticated weapons and were prone to damage when landing on water, especially on a wave; they were normally aimed at the bottom of a wave but, needless to say, this was rather difficult.

However, during a torpedo run, the attacking aircraft were easy targets for defending fighters from a combat air patrol. Furthermore, torpedo planes were also highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire, particularly the heavy anti-aircraft guns (such as the 5 inch DP) which fired into the water, creating water spouts to slap the torpedo planes.

As if that were not enough - it weren't - I have also discovered that the British relied primarily on the navy to sink the Bismarck:

The first phase consisted of air strikes by torpedo-bombers from the British aircraft carrier Ark Royal which disabled Bismarck by jamming her rudders. The second phase was the shadowing and harassment of Bismarck during the night by British destroyers, with no serious damage to any ship. The third phase was an attack by the British battleships King George V and Rodney, supported by cruisers, on the morning of the 27th.

In other words, the luftwaffe ain't got nothing on the kriegsmarine. I rest my case.

A Burning Question

Through the hazy mists of memory I seem to recall a rather enlightened discussion taking place within the confines of our MEH classroom about the 1968 Paris protestations. Perhaps you can picture this scene for yourself - I would in fact desire such a recollection on your part, for if you did not - oh, your understanding of the subject at hand would most certainly be hindered. At the time, my most distinguished colleague Jonathan (distinguished for he was sitting within my presence) ventured forth the analytical opinion that nothing of any true import was accomplished, but that, rather, the French political system remained bound to the shackles of a center-right executive, stretching back from the mustachioed visage of de Gaulle to the seeming hairlessness of Sarkozy. After noting that a superficially similar stagnation took place in both the U.S. and the U.K., one which coincided with a shift - nay, a swing! - towards the more conservative aspects of each country's national psyche, I felt compelled to ask whether similar changes in the makeup of the government (or rather a lack thereof) occurred in other European countries. Were there any significant and comprehensive trend characterizing 4th-quarter, 20th-century, European democracies? I dunno, and if no one else can act in a learned capacity on this matter, I shall have to partake in some wiki-research.

America! #%$* Yeah!

So, American culture sort of owned the world in the post-war period. Just saying. The Europeans couldn't resist the appealing image of a surly, semi-suicidal teenager dangling that carcinogen of cool, the cigarette, from his lips. Sure, we may have been undermining the foundations of centuries upon centuries of European culture, but whatever. We rocked!

But seriously, what did all those continental cats dig our beat so much? My guess is the fragmentation of culture that began at the start of the 20th century (and maybe even beforehand) with the modernist movement. Every genre of music and art was becoming more and more specific and, dare I say?, esoteric, especially after WWII, so American mass culture stepped in to fill the void. And there were a lot more teenagers around, doing their baby-booming thing, as was their wont to do. In addition, America was awesome. Fact.

Oberkommando = So Cool

Having what is possibly the coolest, silliest, and funkiest name in the entirety of the German wehrmacht was the oberkommando der marine (supreme commander of the navy). Though the title is rather self-explanatory, I feel nevertheless compelled to outline the purview of this position. Mr. Oberkommando was in charge of the strategic operations of the kriegsmarine, and he had a number of henchman-like underlings (or so I would like to believe), namely (and take heed, dear reader, for this quote hails from the stygian depth of wikipedia's page on the kriegsmarine - dubious! to say the least) a "Commander-in-Chief (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine), a Chief of Naval General Staff (Chef der Stabes der Seekriegsleitung) and a Chief of Naval Operations (Chef der Operationsabteilung)." These positions were in addition to the standard naval ranks (here is another excerpt from wikipedia, this time comparing the ranks of the German and US/British navies):

Kriegsmarine	US Navy/Royal Navy
Großadmiral	Fleet Admiral/Admiral of the Fleet
Generaladmiral	Admiral
Admiral	Vice Admiral
Vizeadmiral	Rear Admiral (Upper Half)
Konteradmiral	Rear Admiral (Lower Half)
Kommodore	Commodore
Kapitän zur See	Captain
Fregattenkapitän	Commander
Korvettenkapitän	Lieutenant Commander
Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant
Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant (Jg.); Sub-Lieutenant
Leutnant zur See	Ensign/ --
Oberfähnrich zur See	Midshipman (Senior)
Fähnrich zur See	Cadet/Midshipman (Junior)

For instance, the first two oberkommandos, Erich Raeder and Karl Donitz, were both Grand Admirals. Yes, the Germans were quite efficient in their naval organization, and yet...they lost! Why? I will examine that in later blog posts. I will also discuss Raeder and Donitz in greater depth, for they lead rich, or at least half-interesting lives.

Epic Fail (Did I Actually Just Write That?)

So......that analysis I promised to write......well......I think what I was trying to explicate in my previous and probably emotion-laden post on the nature of total war in respect to discrete series of logical formulations of - what was I saying? Oh yeah, my confusion/inability to express the underlying tensions of my brain does not lie in the actions of the participants of WWII during the war - after all, the good student of history should be aware of the extent to which the darker side of human nature continues to emerge, cat-like, to pounce upon the seemingly infallible pillars of civilization...but I digress - rather, my focus is on the actions of the Allies in the immediate aftermath the war.

Liz and Mia have both examined the Nuremberg trials and come to the conclusion that the trials, though exhibiting a hypocrisy of the highest order among the Allied countries, were justified and necessary, especially if one takes into account the new, humanity-based international framework that resulted. I guess I have to agree that it was right for the trials to occur, but were they actually successful in the long run? The fact that the actions of the Allies during the war were not decried, let alone examined, for a while after the war gave those countries a pretty free hand in their international wheelings and dealings (that is, a hand free from the threat of prosecution by a human rights court):

USSR: Stalin! That bastard was around for 8! (EIGHT!) more years after the war ended;
USA: Vietnam and Gitmo, those symbols of American military superiority;
Britain and France: I don't know much about this, but there were definitely brutal tactics used in Kenya and Algeria, respectively.

The actions of these countries have weakened human rights courts and given local despots and warlords around the world the confidence to kill whomever they please. Does this mean the Nuremberg trials were a failure? Was WWII a failure? [The first question was serious, the second purely for hyperbolic purposes].

If You Can't Stand the Heat, Get Out of the Cold War

I enjoyed the Cold War, US-USSR antagonism, brink of nuclear destruction simulation today, and while it is not over yet (though the outcome was already decided when Glorious Leader Stalin decided to free us from the shackles of Leninism and lead us to global Soviet hegemony - go team USSR! and the Jamaican and Irish Socialist Republics!), I am currently of the mind to make a comment or two concerning it and the period of time it pertained to - the first decade and a half after WWII. To begin, what drove these countries to pursue their respective courses of action? In response to Jonathan's post about the Long Telegram, I do agree that the U.S. policymakers weren't really being idealistic, or at least expressing a positive form idealism. I don't know if this is actually a correct term, but maybe we could look at the U.S. as being negatively idealistic. Instead of trying to spread democracy or any other type of ideology, per se (not the correct usage), the policy of the U.S. was negate the spread and effects of another ideology. This is in some ways equally as dangerous as positive idealism because it leads to the same rigid thinking, lack of flexibility, and demonization of the enemy. Not that the Soviets' policy made much more sense (yeah! refuse those eggs!). The players on both sides of the conflict were pretty close-minded and usually unwilling to compromise, with the exception of the occasional thaw once every decade and a half. But I guess M.A.D. ended up working out for everyone. Yeah!

It's All Just Horrible

The "Horrible Histories" series of books from England by Terry Deary is one of the major reasons I became interested in history (note: squeamish be warned, clicking the link above does present the clicker with some cartoon violence, so be wary before rolling your eyes over it). The books' attraction to the youth of my day was their focus on the more violent, and certainly less boring, parts of history (that and the various cartoons interspersed throughout the books' chapters). Yet, at the same time, the books never glorified war or took the blood and gore too lightly; in fact, they often had the opposite effect.

One example that struck me upon first reading it approximately a decade ago and that has stuck with me ever since is from "The Woeful Second World War," which concerned, of all things, WWII. In the particular story, Deary presents the reader with the picture of a night carnival, complete with smiling, happy families and children whose only care in the world is to be next on the ferris wheel (perhaps he was laying it on a bit thick, but it provides an excellent contrast to what would follow). Suddenly, a great number of planes fills the sky and begins dropping tens upon hundreds of bombs. There is fire, death, destruction, horror everywhere, and by the end most of the fair ground is gone, along with the people there. Throughout the entire story, Deary has led the reader to believe that this scene took place in England, that those were British chlidren, German bombs, but after it is done he reveals that this was not the case - that was Berlin, those were German children, RAF planes. Why the British, our allies, would do such a thing confused me, to say the least (I hadn't even learned about Dresden then) and certainly contributed to whatever quest for knowledge I am still on today.

I was reminded of this last summer when I was doing a summer program at Oxford (birthplace of the name-dropper). It so happened that I was reading "Slaughterhouse Five" by Kurt Vonnegut (in which the bombing of Dresden plays a prominent role) right as we were discussing the concept of 'just war' in my international relations class. As an exercise, the class split into groups to determine whether various wars throughout history could be considered 'just,' particularly from the standpoint of the victors. My group analyzed WWII, and we decided that, while the entry of the the various Allied countries into the war was justified (e.g. invasion of Poland and the rest of Europe; Pearl Harbor), much of the Allies' conduct could not be considered just (e.g. the firebombing of Dresden, Tokyo, and many other cities; the use of the atomic bomb).

So what I am I trying to say here? Honestly, this post isn't so much an analysis as a reflection. Of course, it's easy to defend the actions of the U.S. and Britain with the simple mention of the Holocaust, but almost every major player in WWII was complicit in some atrocity - it was just to varying degrees. Man, total war is a real...well, you know, the word that can also mean a canine of the female persuasion. Anywhile, I'll end this post with a quote from "The Fog of War," in which Robert McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War, discusses his role, and that of the U.S., in the bombing of Japan:

[General Curtis] LeMay said if we lost the war that we would have all been prosecuted as war criminals. And I think he's right. He... and I'd say I... were behaving as war criminals. LeMay recognized that what he was doing would be thought immoral if his side has lost. But what makes it immoral if you lose and not immoral if you win? (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0317910/quotes)

Perhaps a more cogent analysis of this subject in a later post - if I can wrap my head around all of this...

In der Marine! Ja, Sie können die sieben Meere durchsegeln!

Now that Jonathan has, on this momentous occasion, revealed to the world our group's paper topic, I feel it is time to start some researching. First off, dibs on die kriegsmarine - sorry Sam, even if Das Boot is your favorite movie (is it? that would be an odd coincidence) you now have to research die heer (and what a heer it was). This first research post could be considered rather short, but I have only just begin to delve into the realm of the unknown that is the kriegsmarine. And so, here's a summary of Plan Z, Germany's uncompleted pre-war fleet-building program, and here's a slideshow of the Battle of the Atlantic (from the Times, hence all the pictures of British ships). May your bacchanalian desire for kriegsmarine-related information be sated for the time being.

Put on your Russian Glasses (Made of Russian Glass)

Here's a little more on Stalin and how he is viewed. This article from December talks about Stalin's popularity, either sustained or renewed, and I think it's interesting to see how Russians themselves look at him. Perhaps, with decades in between them and the purges of the 1930's, today's Russian see only the positive aspects of Stalin's rule: industrialization, defeating Hitler, making the USSR a world power. Like Putin's popularity in the past few years - people were willing to stand by his curtailing of civil liberties while their country was prosperous - maybe Russians are willing to turn a blind eye to Stalin's atrocities. The Soviet Union was never truly defeated, and there was never de-soviet-ification similar to what happened in Germany after World War Two. That's why many Russians consider him one of their greatest countrymen.

What's Your Opinion on Mass Murderers?

Responding to Sam's post, which asked why Hitler has, for the most part, been considered worse than Stalin, I would say that it's not just because the U.S. had allied with the Soviets. Even after World War II and into the Cold War, the American propaganda films focused more on bashing Communism and the Reds in general than on the figure of Stalin, perhaps because Stalin was already dead by 1953. On the other hand, Hitler's image and persona were quite prevalant in American war propaganda, to the point that he was featured in children's cartoons.

Another reason most people's perceptions about the two dictators are often skewed would be the Holocaust - to be more precise, the Holocaust survivors. Enough people managed to survive the Nazi concentration camps and tell their stories that readings about the Holocaust are often required in elementary and middle schools, and there are a number of museums around the world making sure that we "never forget." Compare this to the coverage of Stalin's victims - there are no accounts of life in the gulags I'm aware of besides Solzhenitsyn's works because almost no one escaped - there was no liberation of Stalin's camps. The fact is that Stalin's atrocities aren't as present in the collective memory as Hitler's. It's 6 millions vs. ?

Fascism vs. Liberal Democracy: A Debate of Uberific Proportions

I will begin this post by declaring that I, in my official position as Judge Nate Charnas ("The People's Judge"), having presided over the case of Fascism vs. Liberal Democracy in connexion as to whether the government of the former style is viable and can meet the needs of the governed, do declare that Fascism has lost. May there be feastings of some type for the anti-fascists.

There, now that I've gotten that off my chest I can clearly and calmly offer an analysis and explanation of today's debate and of my shortly subsequent decision. The anti-fascists were pretty successful at arguing against the economic benefits of fascism, citing Italy's deficit under Mussolini, though I feel that the fascists could have provided some good counter-arguments by bringing up the re-militarization of Germany under Hitler. The anti-fascists also pointed out the negative aspects and affects of nationalism (rather strongly, I might add), but they could have gone farther in trying to refute the fascist's claims that nationalism and success go hand in hand, or at least chosen stronger examples than Switzerland and Qatar. The fascists could have argued longer and more clearly about the the need for a strong, central leader in times of crisis like the French Revolution or after World War I, or tried to show that the Weimar Republic was not such an exception to other liberal democracies. The most important point, which I don't think was discussed enough, concerned how the curtailment of civil rights met the needs of the governed. The fascists argued about the importance of the common or greater good over the needs of the individual, but this reflected a set of beliefs more than evidence or an argument. I realize it was hard to justify Hitler's actions against Jewish Germans, but some historical example of the benefits for the governed of curtailing rights (it didn't even have to be from Germany) would have definitely helped.

To Gird a Word is Absurd, so I've Heard: A Treatise on Historical Absurdity

Perhaps, you, reader, in your recent perusals of my previous blog posts, have noticed an increasing tendency towards the absurd. Well, let me assure you that this was quite intentional and not, rather, the quasi-physical manifestations of the very breaking-down of my mind. No, the randomness you might have perceived to be present on this url of unrivaled magnificence was not the "rambling" of a "crazy" "person" - it all leads to a point! An absurd point! Well, actually, no - the absurdity was done for the sake of absurdity, myself being a fan of the word of the absurd. But, I figured, with such absurdity already wafting through the blogospheric atmosphere (the kids still call it that, right?) like a nonsensical phermone (or aphrodesiac - wait, no, that just sounds weird), I would write a post dealing with the absurd in a rather-more-than-cursory way. And so, I end this absurd introductory paragraph, in which I have used some form of the word "absurd" over 7, no 8 times (rather absurdly I might add - oh no! 9 times!), and thus begin the meat, the crux, the meaty crux of what I am trying to say...............absurdly...............(10 times!)...............



As I read what might have been the section of the MEH textbook assigned for tomorrow's class (being syllabus-less, I cannot be sure), I found myself chuckling, nay guffawing, at John Heartfield's "Have No Fear - He's a Vegetarian" on page 944. The picture itself, though literally/photographically crazy (...absurd...) is nonetheless quite true and, more to the point, incredibly chilling (it's meaning is explained in the textbook). Heartfield was a communist and dadaist (or at least sympathized with the movements), and, according to the online brochure for a Heartfield exhibition at the Getty Museum, he "unleashed his sharpest satire on Hitler's Führerkult (cult of the leader), the basis of German Fascism. These montages parody Hitler's most iconic poses, gestures, and symbols to create the impression that one need only to scratch the thin surface of Fascist propaganda to uncover its absurd [!!!] reality."

It seems to me Heartfield was one of the many Europeans who had lived through World War I, seen the rise and spread of fascism and Hitler's ascension to power, and thought, "How is Mussolini in power? Why are so many people listening to what Hitler says? Why are the rest not paying attention to him? This makes no sense. How could this possibly be happening? Did we spend four years fighting in World War One, at the cost of millions of lives, for nothing? This is absurd!" Of course, the dadaists had already acknowledged that the world was an absurd place during World War One, when Marcel Duchamp's forays into what-the-hell?-ness were at their strangest and strongest (see page 930 or any of Duchamp's works from that period). Hitler and everything he represented, not to mention the allies appeasement of him, just cemented these views.

Heartfield's picture also reminded me of Max Ernst's "Une Semaine de Bonté" or "A Week of Kindness," which I discovered randomly at Green Apple Books (a quality bookstore). A book full of collages, it is divided into 7 sections (for each day of the week) with some theme or common image running through all the collages of a certain section. And it really doesn't make any sense, at least to the conscious mind. It is instead meant to appeal to the reader's feelings and emotions, and there is definitely a "mood of catastrophe that pervades this collage 'novel'"that every interpretation attributes to the fact that Ernst was putting this together in Italy (remember, that's fascist Italy) and in 1933, just after Hitler had been appointed Chancellor of Germany. Yes, it's crazy, it's absurd - not just the book - Hitler, Europe, history - that's what's damned absurd - the world is absurd.

(17 times!)

The Technology of Death

I mostly agree with Sam's post about total war, but I don't think the fact that the conditions of World War One caused considerable mental-warping for the soldiers involved fully explains why the war was so atrocity-ridden. I believe (and this may be getting all philosophical and stuff) that soldiers in war were always mentally and emotionally capable of committing these atrocities and were limited only by the technological advancements (or lack thereof) of their time. Machine guns, poison gas, shells, even tanks and planes near the end of the war - all these things enabled soldiers to kill, wound, traumatize, and destroy on a scale previously unimaginable. On a lighter note, I enjoyed the link to the TV tropes page on World War One. Besides being quite funny, they also show the impact that World War One has had over the past 95 years. But I feel I have written perhaps a few too many posts on this subject, and so let this be the last World War One post on my blog.

Unless there's something else cool to write about.

In which case I will, once again, write about World War One.

And, if such a case should occur, I will acknowledge the fact that I claimed I would cease from World War One posts.

Cause you got to stay true to what you say.

SOME People OBVIOUSLY Can't FATHOM My BRILLIANCE

To Mssrs. Jonathan and the hundreds of others who read my learned blog on a daily basis,

I shall have you know that you made an unforgivable mistake in your recent blog posting. What is this mention of "reds" and "whites," this talk of revolution-from-below and Lenin? Clearly you are hopelessly mired in the early 1920s, content to pick at the uncomplicated events of the Russian Civil War whilst sullying the good name of your peers. Well I say to that harrumph, good sir! I do believe it was plain for all to see that my erudite analysis of the Russian psyche concerned the period of time known as (and I quote myself, wonderfully) "the late 1920s" and "the 1930s." Yes, you may have stumbled upon an inkling of correctitude, namely that (and I quote you, unfortunately) "for the most part, people went with their own self interest," and certainly this was true for those caught up in the hellish maelstrom the aforementioned civil war, but...actually, this was also true for those pinned down under the terrible weight of Stalin's revolution-from-above. Perhaps I did not happen to fill my sentences with enough clarity, or rather I forgot to mention the very motivating factor of fear that Stalin so exuded, that fear of deporation, of famine, and of death. Now, most rational beings, acting out of their own-self interest, would take steps to ensure that they were not exposed to such things, even if these "steps" involved working for a totalitarianly murderous regime. But, such fear as this, coinciding with the purges of the 1930s, was not so everpresent when Stalin first took power and began instituting his policies. What about those people who implemented and carried out Stalin's plans in the beginning? Why did they act the way they did? What motivated them? I expect the answers to all the questions on the morrow, attached with twine to the leg of a mottled speckledove.

Your good sir,
Nate

The Terror Justified Redux

Putting ourselves in the shoes (or boots) of the Bolsheviks and the leaders of the communist party of the USSR on Monday, almost everyone put the survival of the state and the communist ideology as a top priority and the guarantee and protection of civil liberties as unimportant or even dangerous to the Soviet cause. This was the mindset of those in charge of the Soviet Union in the late 1920s, and they were willing to go to any means to achieve their goals, even if this meant killing (take a deep breath) millions of their own countrymen. Was this justifed? Hell no! I think a better question to ask is whether the people who participated in such terrible state actions, such as carrying out the purges of the 1930s, believed these actions were justified, or whether they did these things only as way to increase their own power and eliminate enemies (real and imagined). The latter case is most certainly true for Stalin, that personification of revolutionary betrayal. But what about the party members in positions of less power who were obeying orders from the top? Did they think they were doing the right thing or were they acting out of self-interest? Yes, there are always people blinded by ideology enough to do anything or people willing to undertake grotesquely Machiavellian tactics for their own gain. But most people, like those in the Nazi regimes and other totalitarian governments, were probably just doing as they were told.

Weekly Summary Six

So...WWI. Kinda awkward. As Cas has put it, the beginning of the period where Europe "lost its marbles." Jonathan's post about the "ingrained conservatism of the military leaders of the time" and Declan's post about the war's surreality complement each other nicely and are two different ways of exploring the war's effect on the European psyche. Europe basically could not cope with something so strange, new, and horrible, thus hindering the attempts of both sides to achieve victory and permanently changing the face of European politics as old monarchies fell and new totalitarian regimes rose. A former teacher of mine described the war as a pyrrhic victory for the British because it ruined their economy and hastened the demise of their empire. World War One defeated not just the Germans and Austro-Hungarians, but all of Europe.

Versailles Treaty Excercise: An Excercise in the Versailles Treaty

I enjoyed the peace conference exercise we did on Friday. The inclusion of Germany and Japan would have made it more interesting, and probably much more complicated, but the situation and the goals of each country (or potential country) were still fairly accurate. The one aspect of the conference that wasn't covered was colonialism and imperialism. Although the territories involved fall outside of the boundaries of Europe, the existence of colonies or desire to establish colonies in those areas played their part in the relations between the countries. In Africa, Britain and France kept their colonial empires and split up the German colonies between themselves. There had already been tension between Britain and France (and Russia before the Revolution) over the fate of the Ottoman Empire during World War One, and once the war was over these problems became apparent during the peace conference, resulting in the division of the Middle East into British and French mandates and the disastrous consequences of such actions. In addition, the imperialist tendencies of the British and French undermined the peace process and made the League of Nations more than a bit hypocritical, contributing to its lack of power in the following decades. After World War One, imperialism was still a potent force.

David Fromkin's "A Peace to End All Peace" is an excellent book on the subject.

Factors...factors...factors of World War One...

In "The Armaggeddon Waltz," an op-ed in the New York Times yesterday, Frederic Morton describes a financially strapped and politically volatile world of 1913 Vienna. He makes the point that this was a place where Stalin and Trotsky (separately) planned for a communist revolution, where Hitler attended art school, and the archduke Franz Ferdinand met with the Austro-Hungarian emperor, his uncle, in an attempt to convince him to cease the military activities in Albania that were only further provoking the already angry Serbians; the seeds of World War I, the Russian Revolution, and even World War II could be traced back to this city. I found this quite interesting (although not Morton's final analysis that America could somehow be similar). There were so many infinitesimally minuscule factors that shaped the course of history leading up to the first World War that I think the conclusion that the war was an inevitable occurrence is an enormous oversimplification. For instance, there had already been numerous instance of imperial sabre-rattling, even when the alliance that existed in WWI were already in place, such as during the Second Moroccan Crisis. With WWI, it was just that no country backed down. What would have happened if Franz Ferdinand had convinced his uncle to pursue a less belligerent policy in the Balkans. Maybe a conflict similar to WWI would have occurred at a later date, maybe it would have never occurred, but there is no certainty about either option.

Weekly Summary Five

Many people this week have been posting about Freud and Nietzsche. I found especially interesting Leigh's claim that Nietzsche's "theories about repeated lives and divine death echoed Hindu and Buddhist doctrine; thus, western philosophy began to take on a distinctly eastern feel." This could be a result of the first stages of globalization that Zak writes about. Globalization wasn't and isn't simply economic but very often cultural too. For instance, as we learned in Western Civ. the composition of Japanese woodcuts had a significant impact on Impressionism. And, as Leigh mentioned, there was a similar impact on philosophy. Perhaps this exposure to other philosophy's from around the world didn't just start finding their way into the thinking of Western philosophers, but actually made these philosophers question much of the tradition of Western philosophy.

Nietzschean Poetry

Negative will to power causes
Inward
Expression
That
leadZ to
Self-
Consciousness,
Hurting oneself, and
Eschatological religion

This is all very Freudian...

Regardless of the veracity of Sigmund Freud's opinions (perhaps more on that in another post), the excerpt we read from Civilization and Its Discontents, written in 1929, is a good example of one the ways World War I affected European thought. Freud's basic spiel is that there is a "powerful share of aggressiveness," inherent in humanity that is both violent and sexual (it just wouldn't be Freud without some reference to sex), and in respect to the former type of aggressiveness, it's hard to imagine someone emerging from the "horrors of the recent World War," as a participant or just an observer, and still believing that deep down humans are actually just kind, caring creatures. Thus, I think it makes sense that Freud in his attempts to analyze the mind and human behavior would come to the conclusions that he does.

Weekly Summary Four

There has been considerable discussion on the blogs about Russia, specifically the actions of the last two or three tsars. Jonathan post highlights everything the tsars did wrong, and Mia's post explains why this was so: tradition. Basically, the tsars didn't know the true state of affairs in their country and acted according to their own views of the Russia's government, culture, and history. In fact, many of the tsars, if not all of them, believed in some Russia-specific version of the divine right of kings. This was clearly not going to work in a country with a working class that was becoming increasingly radicalized, not to mention just increasing in number. And that's how you get the Bolsheviks in power.

USING ALL CAPITALS IS IRRATIONAL (Coffin 855-862)

A belief in the irrational nature of humans seems to have been a big part of the philosophy (under which umbrella I am including psychology) and culture of the early modern age. This is pretty clear in Sigmund Freud's work on the mind, specifically concerning the id, and art like Edvard Munch's "The Scream" or Franz Kafka's short stories, which, intentionally or not, show Freudian influences. But aside from some type of revolution occurring in the collective mind of the more educated Europeans, what impact did all of this have on the (I apologize for this) Joe Sixpacks of Europe, or, rather, the Johann Steinkrugs? As the textbook explains, "the theories of...Freud, though in the air and troubling [to members of the middle class], did not matter to the same degree [as movements like Socialism]" (Coffin 857), and sure, people in the middle class were probably more worried about making money and feeding their families than on the workings of the mind or the role of art in modern society, but I think there's more too it. Perhaps they were "distracted" by the newly expanding consumer culture and the various technological developments of the time. Somewhat conversely, maybe they didn't want to leave behind Europe's previous philosophical and artistic traditions, which many probably believed justified European supremacy around the world. Maybe the idea of irrationality even scared Europeans to the point that they rejected it, or at least did not continue to pay attention to it. Still, regardless of the effect on average Europeans, the idea of irrationality was significant in European history.

Mr. Lambsley's Strange Constitutional (Coffin 824-837)

So, the textbook mentions that there was a "discussion on the decline of the West amid a growing sense of cultural crisis" (Coffin 836-837) occurring in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Having not read the entire chapter, I cannot comment on the philosophical aspect of this belief in the decay of Western civilization, but I think I can safely say that this belief was spurred on by all the new developments taking place in this period. For instance, what say you're a stiff-lipped British aristocrat leaving whatever your parliamentary building is called for your morning constitutional. Your name could Lambsley. As you walk out the door you hear two members of parliament speaking about socialism without disdain. Disturbed by this incident you hurry off but are immediately confronted by a women's suffrage rally! "Good heavens! What next?" you mumble, and you back away from such a mad gathering, but what is this you have now stumbled upon? It is an advertisement for some horrendously new-fangled contraption called a bi-cycle. You drop your cane and run, run without looking back. But what was the point of that "digression?" Mainly that a lot of new stuff was happening that hadn't happened before, or at least to so great an extent. If you happened to be like Mr. Lambsley, the changes of mass politics and consumer culture, not to mention of industry or philosophy, were probably a bit of a jolt.

Weekly Summary Three

I found Nick's weekly summary, which was actually a response to Danielle's response to Elizabeth's post, interesting, especially the claim that "military necessity forced the British to abandon 'civilized' practices of warfare." The British were fine economically subjugating, or even directly ruling, a country without straying from the traditional, European rules of engagement (feel free to put sarcastic quotation marks around any of the last five words), but once they felt their power and control over a country was threatened they would feel free to use deadly force. Hence, the blowing up of sepoys after the Indian Mutiny in 1857. But, as Charlie pointed out the British realized this approach wouldn't work out in the long run. I guess the conclusion I have is that, fairly similar to Nick's, the British pretty much did horrible things when they felt they had to, but also that this was not their preferable course of action.

Cognitive Dissonance

During one of the classes this week Cas mentioned the cognitive dissonance that the countries and people of Europe experienced in relation to the colonization and exploitation of other continents, particularly Africa, and nowhere is there a better example of this than the pro-Boer movement. This movement protested the British use of concentration camps for the Boers in South Africa, and pro-Boers "campaigned against these violations of white European's rights while saying very little about the fate of native Africans in the conflict" (Coffin, 819). This is one of the dumbest and most nonsensical things anyone could come up with, unless, of course, they shared that odd mixture of imperialist, racist, and enlightenment belief. While a pro-Boer's stance of "Don't do anything bad to African people (as long as they're white)" doesn't sit quite well with most of us in 2009, it sure made a lot of sense to 19th-century Europeans. Without cognitive dissonance, there wouldn't have been such an acceptance of imperialism, let alone the drive to civilize the rest of the world. It was this cognitive dissonance that justified imperialist foreign policies to the liberal democratic (and other) governments of Europe and their people.

The Great Game: IT WAS GREAT!

The textbook mentions the "Great Game" briefly in its discussion of Russian imperialism, describing it as "the maneuvering, spying, and support of friendly puppet governments" (Coffin, 803) between Britain and Russia in Central Asia and the Middle East. This topic is a particular favorite of mine, but I also think it presents a good case study for the many different forms European imperialism took in the 19th and early 20th centuries. With Russia there is the expansionary form of imperialism, in that Russia was conquering neighboring lands (the Caucasus region, Kazakhstan and Turkestan), whereas with Britain there is the other, overseas, form of imperialism, in which Britain was conquering far off lands (India). (Note that I am not making a distinction between expansionism and imperialism, but rather a distinction between types of imperialism).

Of course, it wasn't all conquering, or the direct rule of formal imperialism. Both Russia and Britain often practiced an informal imperialism, extending their separate spheres of influence by making deals with the local khans, emirs, and other despots, particularly in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. In fact, this informal imperialism usually occurred before any formal imperialism. It was easier for the European countries because they could still get concessions, resources, and new markets without having a military presence in the area. However, these agreements between the European countries and the local rulers eventually ended in most cases. For instance, the local ruler would grow tired of one country's influence, and, believing his army to be strong enough, would either exchange the influence of Russia for Britain (or vice-versa) or strive to be independent. On the other hand, Britain and Russia could feel that the time was right for an new territory and scrap the agreements themselves. In any of those cases, informal imperialism led to formal imperialism when the European countries invaded the territory (historical examples are the Russian campaigns in Central Asia in 1868-1870 and Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1838-1842 and 1878-1880; not all of these, however, were successful for the European countries).

The motivations of each country are also important to consider. Besides economics, which I have already mentioned (new markets, resources), Russia engaged in much of this imperialism for power, glory, and a demonstration of strength. Britain spent so much time in the area in an attempt to check Russia's imperial ambitions, which were a growing threat to India, and by extension Britain's entire empire. In addition, there was much public support in both countries for the imperial undertakings that took place during the "Great Game." The "Great Game" is still around in the present day (though many features of it have changed); it continued through World War One, the Russian Revolution and Soviet imperialism (both in the 1920s and later with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan), and even past the break-up of the colonial empires. You could argue whether or not the current U.S. engagement in Afghanistan counts as part of a new "Great Game" or not, but there is definitely still competition for resources in Central Asia and the Middle East for natural gas and oil, respectively. To conclude, I think the "Great Game" is fascinating, and a very good example of European imperialism.

Note: For those interested, check out "The Great Game" by Peter Hopkirk. You could also look up Vasily V. Vereschagin on the internet; he was a Russian artist who had paintings of the Russian campaigns in Central Asia, as well as painting or two of the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny.

Weekly Summary Two

Over the past week many of my fellow bloggers have discussed the United State’s status as a nation. The consensus was that the U.S. is a nation because we say it is, so stop asking whether or not it’s a nation, and I too believe this to be true. We are constantly reminded, especially during presidential elections and inaugurations, that, though we may be different in some ways, we also have much in common that we should celebrate and be willing to protect. In addition, much of American history has exhibited a tendency towards the top-down nationalism favored by political leaders in the second half of the 19th century, particularly with Lincoln trying to preserve the union of the country during the Civil War. It’s interesting to see the ways in which the development of the U.S. in the 19th century was similar to Europe’s, not just with nationalism but also with imperialism. Though our country’s history is unique, we do share more in common with Europe than we think.

The Morality of Realism (Coffin 778-779)

There seems to be a contradiction in the way the textbook presents realism. While the textbook explains that “realism’s focus on the material world owed much to the ideals of nineteenth-century science, which seemed to cut through traditional moral and philosophical concerns in pursuit of empirical facts,” it also says that realists had a “sympathy for the poor and dispossessed” and offered up “sharp critique[s] of contemporary society” (all quotes from page 779). How can this be resolved? Though many realists claimed that the pursuit of realism was an end in of itself, I think most used realism as a means to revealing the nature of humanity or exposing the problems of society. In literature, true, accurate realism suggests a physical and emotional removal of the author and narrator from the plot, but many writers wrote sympathetically of the lower class characters in their novels and gave more than a little support to the idea of justice and equality for everyone. Perhaps such a removal is easier accomplished in painting or sculpture, but the artists were still making a judgment by choosing the subject matter they did. Whether a painting of a beggar or a novel about a prostitute, the choice of subject matter, if not the subject matter itself, was subjective. The very act of portraying something in a realist way was subjective. Basically, I don’t think “moral and philosophical concerns” were divorced from realism but, rather, were inherent to the school of thought.

The Impact of the Crimean War (Coffin 776-777)

Though the Crimean War was short and not a true victory for any of the countries involved, it had far-reaching effects, and, though I am going beyond the time period we are currently studying, I think many of the root causes of World War One lie in the circumstances surrounding the Crimean War. First and foremost are the alliances. After having been involved in over a century of intermittent warfare, culminating in the 25 years from the French Revolution to Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, Britain and France allied in response to the mutual threat of Russian expansion in Eastern Europe. Regardless of whether this alliance held for every year between 1854 and 1914 (I’ll admit I do not know the complete history of the alliance), the two former enemies had set a precedent for themselves of joining forces. On the other hand, when Austria chose not to support Russia, that alliance dissolved. Those two countries would be antagonists in World War One, and Russia, now with no strong allies, would eventually form an alliance with its former enemies, Britain and France. The other major impact of the Crimean War, according to page 777 of the textbook, was the weakening of Russia and Austria. The reduction of those two countries’ power and influence proved very beneficial to Prussia’s ambitions and the eventual unification of Germany, whose very existence upset the balance of power in Europe. The impact of the Crimean War was terribly large not in the short-run, but in the long-run.

Weekly Summary One

I'm not really sure how this summary paragraph should work, but from the reading and everyone's blog posts I get the sense that the first half of the 19th century must have been an extremely chaotic time to live in. There were class revolts, government reforms, and cultural rebellions all over Europe. Almost everyone must have been aware of all the conflict that was occurring and all the changes that were taking place, and whether you were a baker, a bureaucrat, or some type of creative person whose profession begins with the letter “b” so that I might be able to have some alliteration in my sentence, at least one aspect of your life probably would have changed over a ten year period. Perhaps I am being hyperbolic. Most people’s lives will have changed at least a bit over ten years, but not necessarily so society. It’s interesting to see how much happened in that time despite the many attempts by conservatives to crush revolts and maintain order. Napoleon basically opened up the Pandora’s box, or genie’s bottle, of Liberalism and Nationalism, and no matter how many times these movements were prevented from succeeding in their goals, they still stayed around and stuck it out. In fact, Conservative retaliation only made some members of these movements more radical and more ardent about their cause. I did mention in an earlier post that Conservatism in Europe, or at least Conservatism based on the Congress of Vienna did not fall apart in one big piece, but it was still being chipped away at slowly. So, basically Europe went through a lot of awkward changes.

Unifications of Nations

The separate unifications of the Italian and German states provide us with many interesting similarities. The nationalist movements in both eventual countries were driven primarily by one of the many states that would later comprise each country. These specific states, Piedmont-Sardinia in Italy and Prussia in Germany, were the top political, military, and economic powers in their respective regions, and they initiated both the military and diplomatic maneuvers that enabled their countries to eventually unify. Furthermore, the unification in each country was, for the most part, a form of top-down nationalism. The governments in Piedmont-Sardinia and Prussia, and their monarchs in particular, had rejected the previous attempts at unification during the 1848 revolutions, specifically Mazzini’s Republican movement and, as I mentioned in a previous post, a constitutional monarchy that Frederick William IV considered “too liberal” (Coffin 749). These monarchs were willing to support Nationalism, but they wanted to do it on their own terms and to establish a state of their liking. What do these similarities all mean, though? I think these comparisons complement my last post on Conservatism. It was still around after 1848, but it did have to adapt a bit by co-opting nationalist movements.

More Conservatism!!! (Coffin739-753)!!!

Though gains for Liberalism were slowly being made in Europe over the course of the 19th century, the Conservatism still remained a significant force in Europe both during and after the 1848 revolutions. Regardless of his own political beliefs, in the first few years after Louis Napoleon was elected president of France he restored and strengthened France’s ties with the Catholic church, cracked down on workers’ organizations, and became emperor of the Second French Empire, although he did this with the people’s support. After the revolution in Germany, Prussian ruler Frederick William IV refused to become king of the proposed nation of Germany because he thought its constitution was too liberal, and soon thereafter defeated the revolutionaries. In Hungary, the Russian army simply crushed the revolution led by Lajos Kossuth after Austria asked Tsar Nicholas I to do so. While opposition to Conservatism did increase in this time, the Conservative attempt at Restoration did not fall apart in one big piece.

Perhaps I am Nitpicking the Mean Nurse...

This is in response to Lollote's post:

That is a good analysis and overview of Romanticism, but I don’t entirely agree with your last paragraph. The modern sensibility of art and the artist that many of us have definitely came from the Romantic period, and Romanticism had a very large impact on the course of European history. However, Romanticism was only a reaction to a way of viewing the world and creating art. Modernism, for the most part, was a conscious attempt to make a significant break with the past. Many romantics looked to the past for inspiration or used texts from the past in their work. They did react to Classicism, but they were continuing the traditions of European art and culture on at least a technical level, whereas the modernists put their focus mainly on the present and the future and experimented with the basic building blocks of their respective mediums. Perhaps that distinction is not strong enough, and the two movements were similar in many ways, particularly in terms of a rejection of the past and individuality, but I still think that, while Romanticism did break with the past to some extent, this break was not enough to warrant a division in European history between everything that happened before Romanticism and everything that happened after.

Who needs the French Revolution?

This is in response to JED's post and DLemma's comment on the same post:

The French Revolution certainly spread the ideas of liberty, equality, and fraternity across Europe, and it expedited the growth and development of the 19th-century ideologies supporting or reacting to those ideas. However, I think the right conditions for conservatism, liberalism, socialism, and nationalism were already in place in Europe before the French Revolution. In other words - you could consider this type of counterfactual - the French Revolution was not necessary for the creation of these ideologies to occur. The Enlightenment ideas had already been discussed throughout Europe for a century. The Industrial Revolution, and the social disparities that came along with it, had already begun in Britain before the French Revolution. If there were no French Revolution, the main difference between this hypothetical situation and the real subsequent history of Europe would be that the Conservative movement would have been considerably weaker.

Karl Marx, or Mr. Presumes-a-lot

I will admit that I approached tonight’s reading of The Communist Manifesto with quite a bit of bias against it. I had experienced a brief infatuation with communism in the 9th grade – I believe it occurred not long after reading A People’s History of the United States – but I soon realized the contradictions and, dare I say, utter foolishness of this deterministic and paternalistic system of thought, and my opinions on the subject weren’t changed by this reading. This is not to say, however, that capitalism is absolved of any guilt. There are problems inherent in that system too – no one can deny the terrible conditions that so many working-class people in Europe suffered through – but it is Marx who I have my eye on for this post.

So back to those two qualities I have ascribed to Communism: deterministic and paternalistic. Now, having the benefit of knowing the past 160 years of history, I could write multiple pages on how history has proven Marx wrong (it would probably sound like this: Marx claims that “national differences and antagonism between peoples are daily more and more vanishing.” Really. World War One? World War One! WORLD WAR ONE!), so I will refrain from that tempting exercise in bombast. Still, his take on the future seems incredibly naïve if we take even the slightest glimpse at the past or at human nature. When the proletariat take over and reorganize the hell out of everything as they see fit - well, first off, who’s making all these changes? None of Marx’s “conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat” could be accomplished on a large scale without some central, organized authority. Marx assumes everything’s gonna be peachy-keen, that “the public power will lose its political character,” but, call me a pessimist, I don’t believe there is very large percentage of humankind who, upon reaching a position of power, is content to give up that power of their own accord. Was Marx not an educated man? (That is perhaps a bit mean-spirited; for the record, he was educated). But if he thought everything was going to work itself out, he had to have been kidding himself.

I don’t have much to say about the paternalism in this excerpt. Marx is basically claiming that Communists know what every working-class person wants. That doesn’t really contradict anything in Communist ideology, but Marx is once again presuming quite a lot, as it seems to be his wont to do.

Revolution, Restoration, and Britain (Coffin 709-717)

In addition to the Industrial Revolution, the effects of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars made Britain and its empire one of the most powerful entities of the 19th century. To begin with, Britain won the wars, so it didn't have to give away any money as an indemnity, like the French did (also, Britain's infrastructure wasn't even damaged, as happened with countries on the continent, particularly Russia). In fact, Britain received new territories from France as compensation for the war, increasing the size of the British Empire and giving a large base from which to expand. The British Empire also benefited from the Congress of Vienna. The delegates there wanted stability in Europe and thought the best way to achieve this goal would be to maintain a balance of power by means of organizations like the Quintuple Alliance and the creation of small independent states. This meant that Britain's rivals wouldn't become too powerful a threat to Britain, or, if they did, the other countries of Europe would ally with Britain against that rival. Britain, then, didn't have to commit as many troops to Europe and could instead use its armies to conquer and rule territory for its empire. In the Western Hemisphere, the French Revolution and the ideas associated with it had inspired revolutions and wars of independence in almost every country. These developments took land, resources, and markets away from some of Britain's trading competitors, Portugal and Spain, and opened up new markets for British goods. The Monroe Doctrine in 1823, which warned against European intervention in the Western Hemisphere and which Britain supported, helped secure these markets for Britain. Interestingly enough, the ideas of both the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna, which was a reaction to the French Revolution and Napoleonic wars, were beneficial to Britain and the growth of its empire.