Weekly Summary Five

Many people this week have been posting about Freud and Nietzsche. I found especially interesting Leigh's claim that Nietzsche's "theories about repeated lives and divine death echoed Hindu and Buddhist doctrine; thus, western philosophy began to take on a distinctly eastern feel." This could be a result of the first stages of globalization that Zak writes about. Globalization wasn't and isn't simply economic but very often cultural too. For instance, as we learned in Western Civ. the composition of Japanese woodcuts had a significant impact on Impressionism. And, as Leigh mentioned, there was a similar impact on philosophy. Perhaps this exposure to other philosophy's from around the world didn't just start finding their way into the thinking of Western philosophers, but actually made these philosophers question much of the tradition of Western philosophy.

Nietzschean Poetry

Negative will to power causes
Inward
Expression
That
leadZ to
Self-
Consciousness,
Hurting oneself, and
Eschatological religion

This is all very Freudian...

Regardless of the veracity of Sigmund Freud's opinions (perhaps more on that in another post), the excerpt we read from Civilization and Its Discontents, written in 1929, is a good example of one the ways World War I affected European thought. Freud's basic spiel is that there is a "powerful share of aggressiveness," inherent in humanity that is both violent and sexual (it just wouldn't be Freud without some reference to sex), and in respect to the former type of aggressiveness, it's hard to imagine someone emerging from the "horrors of the recent World War," as a participant or just an observer, and still believing that deep down humans are actually just kind, caring creatures. Thus, I think it makes sense that Freud in his attempts to analyze the mind and human behavior would come to the conclusions that he does.

Weekly Summary Four

There has been considerable discussion on the blogs about Russia, specifically the actions of the last two or three tsars. Jonathan post highlights everything the tsars did wrong, and Mia's post explains why this was so: tradition. Basically, the tsars didn't know the true state of affairs in their country and acted according to their own views of the Russia's government, culture, and history. In fact, many of the tsars, if not all of them, believed in some Russia-specific version of the divine right of kings. This was clearly not going to work in a country with a working class that was becoming increasingly radicalized, not to mention just increasing in number. And that's how you get the Bolsheviks in power.

USING ALL CAPITALS IS IRRATIONAL (Coffin 855-862)

A belief in the irrational nature of humans seems to have been a big part of the philosophy (under which umbrella I am including psychology) and culture of the early modern age. This is pretty clear in Sigmund Freud's work on the mind, specifically concerning the id, and art like Edvard Munch's "The Scream" or Franz Kafka's short stories, which, intentionally or not, show Freudian influences. But aside from some type of revolution occurring in the collective mind of the more educated Europeans, what impact did all of this have on the (I apologize for this) Joe Sixpacks of Europe, or, rather, the Johann Steinkrugs? As the textbook explains, "the theories of...Freud, though in the air and troubling [to members of the middle class], did not matter to the same degree [as movements like Socialism]" (Coffin 857), and sure, people in the middle class were probably more worried about making money and feeding their families than on the workings of the mind or the role of art in modern society, but I think there's more too it. Perhaps they were "distracted" by the newly expanding consumer culture and the various technological developments of the time. Somewhat conversely, maybe they didn't want to leave behind Europe's previous philosophical and artistic traditions, which many probably believed justified European supremacy around the world. Maybe the idea of irrationality even scared Europeans to the point that they rejected it, or at least did not continue to pay attention to it. Still, regardless of the effect on average Europeans, the idea of irrationality was significant in European history.

Mr. Lambsley's Strange Constitutional (Coffin 824-837)

So, the textbook mentions that there was a "discussion on the decline of the West amid a growing sense of cultural crisis" (Coffin 836-837) occurring in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Having not read the entire chapter, I cannot comment on the philosophical aspect of this belief in the decay of Western civilization, but I think I can safely say that this belief was spurred on by all the new developments taking place in this period. For instance, what say you're a stiff-lipped British aristocrat leaving whatever your parliamentary building is called for your morning constitutional. Your name could Lambsley. As you walk out the door you hear two members of parliament speaking about socialism without disdain. Disturbed by this incident you hurry off but are immediately confronted by a women's suffrage rally! "Good heavens! What next?" you mumble, and you back away from such a mad gathering, but what is this you have now stumbled upon? It is an advertisement for some horrendously new-fangled contraption called a bi-cycle. You drop your cane and run, run without looking back. But what was the point of that "digression?" Mainly that a lot of new stuff was happening that hadn't happened before, or at least to so great an extent. If you happened to be like Mr. Lambsley, the changes of mass politics and consumer culture, not to mention of industry or philosophy, were probably a bit of a jolt.

Weekly Summary Three

I found Nick's weekly summary, which was actually a response to Danielle's response to Elizabeth's post, interesting, especially the claim that "military necessity forced the British to abandon 'civilized' practices of warfare." The British were fine economically subjugating, or even directly ruling, a country without straying from the traditional, European rules of engagement (feel free to put sarcastic quotation marks around any of the last five words), but once they felt their power and control over a country was threatened they would feel free to use deadly force. Hence, the blowing up of sepoys after the Indian Mutiny in 1857. But, as Charlie pointed out the British realized this approach wouldn't work out in the long run. I guess the conclusion I have is that, fairly similar to Nick's, the British pretty much did horrible things when they felt they had to, but also that this was not their preferable course of action.

Cognitive Dissonance

During one of the classes this week Cas mentioned the cognitive dissonance that the countries and people of Europe experienced in relation to the colonization and exploitation of other continents, particularly Africa, and nowhere is there a better example of this than the pro-Boer movement. This movement protested the British use of concentration camps for the Boers in South Africa, and pro-Boers "campaigned against these violations of white European's rights while saying very little about the fate of native Africans in the conflict" (Coffin, 819). This is one of the dumbest and most nonsensical things anyone could come up with, unless, of course, they shared that odd mixture of imperialist, racist, and enlightenment belief. While a pro-Boer's stance of "Don't do anything bad to African people (as long as they're white)" doesn't sit quite well with most of us in 2009, it sure made a lot of sense to 19th-century Europeans. Without cognitive dissonance, there wouldn't have been such an acceptance of imperialism, let alone the drive to civilize the rest of the world. It was this cognitive dissonance that justified imperialist foreign policies to the liberal democratic (and other) governments of Europe and their people.

The Great Game: IT WAS GREAT!

The textbook mentions the "Great Game" briefly in its discussion of Russian imperialism, describing it as "the maneuvering, spying, and support of friendly puppet governments" (Coffin, 803) between Britain and Russia in Central Asia and the Middle East. This topic is a particular favorite of mine, but I also think it presents a good case study for the many different forms European imperialism took in the 19th and early 20th centuries. With Russia there is the expansionary form of imperialism, in that Russia was conquering neighboring lands (the Caucasus region, Kazakhstan and Turkestan), whereas with Britain there is the other, overseas, form of imperialism, in which Britain was conquering far off lands (India). (Note that I am not making a distinction between expansionism and imperialism, but rather a distinction between types of imperialism).

Of course, it wasn't all conquering, or the direct rule of formal imperialism. Both Russia and Britain often practiced an informal imperialism, extending their separate spheres of influence by making deals with the local khans, emirs, and other despots, particularly in Afghanistan and Uzbekistan. In fact, this informal imperialism usually occurred before any formal imperialism. It was easier for the European countries because they could still get concessions, resources, and new markets without having a military presence in the area. However, these agreements between the European countries and the local rulers eventually ended in most cases. For instance, the local ruler would grow tired of one country's influence, and, believing his army to be strong enough, would either exchange the influence of Russia for Britain (or vice-versa) or strive to be independent. On the other hand, Britain and Russia could feel that the time was right for an new territory and scrap the agreements themselves. In any of those cases, informal imperialism led to formal imperialism when the European countries invaded the territory (historical examples are the Russian campaigns in Central Asia in 1868-1870 and Anglo-Afghan Wars in 1838-1842 and 1878-1880; not all of these, however, were successful for the European countries).

The motivations of each country are also important to consider. Besides economics, which I have already mentioned (new markets, resources), Russia engaged in much of this imperialism for power, glory, and a demonstration of strength. Britain spent so much time in the area in an attempt to check Russia's imperial ambitions, which were a growing threat to India, and by extension Britain's entire empire. In addition, there was much public support in both countries for the imperial undertakings that took place during the "Great Game." The "Great Game" is still around in the present day (though many features of it have changed); it continued through World War One, the Russian Revolution and Soviet imperialism (both in the 1920s and later with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan), and even past the break-up of the colonial empires. You could argue whether or not the current U.S. engagement in Afghanistan counts as part of a new "Great Game" or not, but there is definitely still competition for resources in Central Asia and the Middle East for natural gas and oil, respectively. To conclude, I think the "Great Game" is fascinating, and a very good example of European imperialism.

Note: For those interested, check out "The Great Game" by Peter Hopkirk. You could also look up Vasily V. Vereschagin on the internet; he was a Russian artist who had paintings of the Russian campaigns in Central Asia, as well as painting or two of the aftermath of the Indian Mutiny.

Weekly Summary Two

Over the past week many of my fellow bloggers have discussed the United State’s status as a nation. The consensus was that the U.S. is a nation because we say it is, so stop asking whether or not it’s a nation, and I too believe this to be true. We are constantly reminded, especially during presidential elections and inaugurations, that, though we may be different in some ways, we also have much in common that we should celebrate and be willing to protect. In addition, much of American history has exhibited a tendency towards the top-down nationalism favored by political leaders in the second half of the 19th century, particularly with Lincoln trying to preserve the union of the country during the Civil War. It’s interesting to see the ways in which the development of the U.S. in the 19th century was similar to Europe’s, not just with nationalism but also with imperialism. Though our country’s history is unique, we do share more in common with Europe than we think.

The Morality of Realism (Coffin 778-779)

There seems to be a contradiction in the way the textbook presents realism. While the textbook explains that “realism’s focus on the material world owed much to the ideals of nineteenth-century science, which seemed to cut through traditional moral and philosophical concerns in pursuit of empirical facts,” it also says that realists had a “sympathy for the poor and dispossessed” and offered up “sharp critique[s] of contemporary society” (all quotes from page 779). How can this be resolved? Though many realists claimed that the pursuit of realism was an end in of itself, I think most used realism as a means to revealing the nature of humanity or exposing the problems of society. In literature, true, accurate realism suggests a physical and emotional removal of the author and narrator from the plot, but many writers wrote sympathetically of the lower class characters in their novels and gave more than a little support to the idea of justice and equality for everyone. Perhaps such a removal is easier accomplished in painting or sculpture, but the artists were still making a judgment by choosing the subject matter they did. Whether a painting of a beggar or a novel about a prostitute, the choice of subject matter, if not the subject matter itself, was subjective. The very act of portraying something in a realist way was subjective. Basically, I don’t think “moral and philosophical concerns” were divorced from realism but, rather, were inherent to the school of thought.

The Impact of the Crimean War (Coffin 776-777)

Though the Crimean War was short and not a true victory for any of the countries involved, it had far-reaching effects, and, though I am going beyond the time period we are currently studying, I think many of the root causes of World War One lie in the circumstances surrounding the Crimean War. First and foremost are the alliances. After having been involved in over a century of intermittent warfare, culminating in the 25 years from the French Revolution to Napoleon’s defeat at Waterloo, Britain and France allied in response to the mutual threat of Russian expansion in Eastern Europe. Regardless of whether this alliance held for every year between 1854 and 1914 (I’ll admit I do not know the complete history of the alliance), the two former enemies had set a precedent for themselves of joining forces. On the other hand, when Austria chose not to support Russia, that alliance dissolved. Those two countries would be antagonists in World War One, and Russia, now with no strong allies, would eventually form an alliance with its former enemies, Britain and France. The other major impact of the Crimean War, according to page 777 of the textbook, was the weakening of Russia and Austria. The reduction of those two countries’ power and influence proved very beneficial to Prussia’s ambitions and the eventual unification of Germany, whose very existence upset the balance of power in Europe. The impact of the Crimean War was terribly large not in the short-run, but in the long-run.